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ABSTRACT
A two-country, perfect-foresight model with Einite lives,
intertemporal budget constraints for the governments and private
sector agents, current-account dynamics, uncovered interest parity,
floating exchange rates, imperfect substitution between home and
foreign goods, international labour immobility, real wage rigidity at
home (Europe) and nominal wage rigidity abroad (US) is formulated and
its steady-state and transient properties are analysed. Numerical
simulation is used to analyse the spill-over effects oE various policy
options. First, the impact, transient and steady-state spill-over
effects oE an increase in European government spending are contrasted
with the corresponding efEects of an increase in US government
spending when a tax rule is used to stabilise the government debt.
Second, some aspects of 'Reaganomics' are discussed which is relevant
when cuts in US taxes gradually lead to increases in US government
debt and only then to cuts in US government spending. Third, the
Sargent-Wallace arguments about unpleasant monetarist arithmetic are
reconsidered within a two-country model. Finally, the spill-over
effects of supply-side policies are discussed.
" The authors are grateful to Gerard Staacink for performing the
computer simulations and to Willem Buiter Eor some helpful
discussions. Van der Ploeg thanks the Economic and Social Research
Council (U.K.) for financial support.CONTENTS
1. Introduction
2. A two-country model with real wage rigidity at home and
nominal wage rigidity abzoad
2.1. Finite lives and the individual's consumption and
savings decisions
2.2. Aggregation across individuals
2.3. Financial assets and the government budget constraint
2.4. Production, labour demand and wage rigidity
2.5. International interdependence
2.6. The complete model
3. Steady-state properties
4. Dynamic policy simulation
4.1. Tight fiscal policy in Europe and loose fiscal policy
in the US
4.2. 'Reaganomics': Tax cuts precede cuts in government
spending







In the traditional one-country Mundell-Fleming world with
floating exchange rates and perEect capital mobility a fiscal
expansion leads to ai~ incipient rise in the interest rate and capital
inElows, which are choked ofE by an appreciation of the exchange rate.
The contraction in net exports completely crowds out the increase in
government spending. The Mundell-Fleming model assumes fixed nominal
wages and only considers aggregate demand. However, real wage rigidity
in aggregate supply reverses the qualitative nature of the policy
conclusions. A fiscal expansion now leads to an appreciation of the
real exchange rate and a cut in the wedge between the producers' and
consumers' waqe, so that employment and output increase (Casas, 1975;
Argy and Salop, 1979; Sachs, 1980; van de Klundert and van der Ploeg,
1987b).
In the two-country Mundell-Fleming world a home fiscal expansion
increases the world interest rate, which reduces the demand for money,
exerts an upward pressure on the price level, erodes the real value of
the wage and therefore increases aggregate supply both at home and
abroad. The appreciation of the home currency and the resulting
increase in net exports oE the foreign country increases the demand
for Eoreign goods, despite the cise in `.he interest rate. Because
fiscal expansion is a locomotive policy in a Mundell-Fleming world, it
can be argued that in the absence of international policy coordination
there is a deflationary bias in fiscal policy and therefore too much
unemployment. However, when both countries have real rather than
nominal wage rigidity, a fiscal expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour
policy as the associated appreciation oE the real exchange rate
increases the wedge between the foreign producers' and consumers' wage
and therefore reduces foreign output and employment (Argy and Salop,
1983; Oudiz and Sachs, 1984; van der Ploeg, 1987). Absence of
international policy coordination now implies that both countries
adopt a too loose fiscal stance, because each country ignores the
adverse effects oE a fiscal expansion on the other country's levels of
employment and output.
However, there is a reasonable amount of evidence that Europe has
real wage rigidity and that the US has nominal wage rigidity (e.g.,-z-
Branson and Rotemberg, 1980; Bruno and Sachs, 1985; van der Ploeg,
1987b). This may be because the European countries have a strong
degree of indexation of wages to consumers' prices whereas the US has
a signiEicant propoction of overlapping nominal wage contracts. In
that case, a European fiscal expansion raises world interest rates,
reduces money demand in the US and thus increases prices in the US
which cuts the US real wage and boosts employment and output in the
US. Hence, a European fiscal expansion is a locomotive policy. On the
other hand, a US fiscal expansion is, tyically, a beggar-thy-neighbour
policy (also see Argy and Salop, 1983). This implies that, in the
absence of international policy coordination, the European fiscal
stance is too tight Erom the US point oE view and too loose Erom the
European point of view whilst the US fiscal stance is, typically, too
loose (van der Ploeg, 1987b).
Such asymmetries in aggregate supply allow one to understand why
the substance oE the policy debate about the performance of the OECD
economies seems to be concerned with the relative tightness of the
European fiscal stance and the relative looseness of the US fiscal
stance and to understand why recovery in Europe seems so hard.
However, it is not clear that the ad-hoc IS~LM~AS two-country models
are well suited to address issues of international interdependence and
policy coordination. Firstly, a considerable part of the policy debate
is about the unsustainability of the trade deficits and government
budget deficits of the US and the possible advecse effects these might
have on the European economies. The tax cuts that have been recently
implemented in the US have resulted in increases in the US deficits
and qovernment borrowing, which will have to be paid off by future
cuts in US government spending and~or future increases in US taxes
(including seigniorage revenues). In other words, it is vital in the
discussion of international policy interdependence to allow Eor the
intertemporal budget constraints of governments and private sector
agents, to allow for current-account dynamics, and to allow Eor wealth
effects in aggregate demand. It is also important for these policy
discussions to allow government debt to be a part of private sector
wealth. Secondly, ad-hoc models go together with ad-hoc social welfare
functions which, typically, depend on squared deviations of output and
inflation from their desired levels. It therefore seems desïrable to
specify a two-country model with micro foundations, because then a- 3 -
propec welEare analysis based on gross consumers' surplusses is
feasible.
Hence, the objective of this paper is to reconsider the nature of
the st~ort-term and long-term international spill-over eEfects of
changes in government spending, taxation and monetary policy in a two-
country model with micro foundations, intertemporal government budget
constraints, current-account dynamics, real wage rigidity at home
(Europe) and nominal wage rigidity abroad (the US). In order to relax
the Ricardian debt neutrality proposition and to give a non-trivial
role for fiscal policy, it is assumed that current generations can
pass the burden of higher taxation on to future generations. This
happens when there is no intergenerational bequest motive and either
lives are finite (Yaari, 1965; Hlanchard, 1985) and~or there is
population growth (Weil, 1986; Buiter, 1988). This paper adopts the
first possibility. It extends Buiter's (1987a) two-country model (and
the infinite-lives, two-country model oE Lipton and Sachs (1983)) to
allow for real and nominal wage rigidity, rather than for labour
market clearing in both countries, and to allow for money, but it is
more restrictive as it abstracts from capital accumulation.
Section 2 formulates a two-country, perEect-foresight model with
finite lives, intertemporal budget constraints Eor the governments and
private sector agents, current-account dynamics, uncovered interest
parity, floating exchange rates, imperfect substitutíon between home
and foreign goods, international labour immobility, real wage rigidity
in Europe (home) and nominal wage rigidity in the US (abroad). It
leads to eight nonlinear difEerential equat:ons in terms of home and
foreign consumption, home and foceign real money balances, home and
foreign government debt, net foreign assets and the Eoreign nominal
wage (normalised by the foreign nominal money supply) and two
nonlinear equations in terms of the real exchanqe rate and the real
interest rate. Section 3 discusses the steady-state properties.
InElation is in the long run a monetary phenomenon and foreign output
and emplo~ment are at their natural rates. An increase in home
government spending or a cut in taxation leads in the long run to a
Eall in t~n world real interest rate, an appreciation oE the real
exchange rate and an increase in home output and employment. An
increase in home monetary growth has no real efEects in the long run;- 4 -
it simply leads to a one-for-one increase in the home inflation rate
and the home nominal ir.terest rate. A cut in the home real wage or an
increase in the foreign natural rate of unemployment leads to a
depreciation of the real exchange rate and an increase in home output.
An increase in foreign government spending or a cut in Eoreign
taxation leads in the long run to a fall in the world real interest
rate, an appreciation oE the foreign real exchange rate and a fall in
home output. Section 4 discusses various dynamic policy simulations
with the aid of a multiple-shooting algorithm. First, the impact,
transient and steady-state spill-over effects oE an increase in
European government spending are contrasted with the corresponding
effects of an increase in US government spending when a tax rule is
used to stabilise the government debt in each country. Particular
attention is paid to the effects on government borrowing and foreign
debt as well as to the real effects. Second, some aspects of
'Reaganomics' are discussed. The main point is that cuts in US
taxation gradually lead to increases in US government debt and only
then to cuts in US government spending (cf., Hlanchard, 1987). The
political economy of Eiscal deflation for the US is such that a rule
Eor government spending to stabilise the government debt is, perhaps,
more realistic than a tax rule. Third, the Sargent-Wallace (1981)
arguments about unpleasant monetaristic arithmetic are reconsidered.
When there is no tax rule or government spending rule to stabilise the
government debt and when there is a ceiling to the amount of
government bonds the private sector is prepared to purchase, an excess
of government spending over taxes plus seigniorage revenues must
eventually be financed by either an increase in monetary growth or a
structural Eiscal adjustment. In the Eormer case, tight money today
implies high inflation tomorrow and, ur,der perfect foresight, possibly
high inflation today. Also, in the process the government debt has
increased and therefore one ends up with a permanently higher
inflation rate in order to meet the interest payments on the
additional government debt (van Wijnbergen, 1985). In the Latter case,
one ends up with either a permanently lower level of government
spending or a higher level of taxation, which one could reEer to as
unpleasant fiscal arithmetic. Finally, the implications oE supply-side
improvements are briefly discussed. Section 5 summarises the results
on international policy interdependence and briefly discusses the
implications for international policy coordination.- 5 -
2. A two-country model with real wage rigidity at home and nominal
wage rigidity abroad
2.1. Finite lives and the individual's consumption and savings
deci~iors
The demand side of each economy is made up of identical consumers
with constant life expectancy. There is no intergenerational bequest
motive, as in the analysis of Blanchard (1985). The (notional) supply
of labour at time t of an individual born at time s ~ t is
inelastic ind rationed due to a too high real wage arising from either
real or nominal wage rigidity. The consumers born at time s: t have
Cobb-Douglas preferences over the consumption at time t of private
home goods, cd(s,t), private foreign goods, cm(s,t), publically
provided home goods, Gd(t), publically provided Eoreign goods,
Gm(t), and real money balances, m(s,t). Feenstra (1985) provides a
justification, based on liquidity costs, for entering money in the
utility function. Government spending usually qives utility, although
it may be of the 'hole-in-the-ground' variety. Consumers have an
intertemporal elasticity of substitution oE unity, so that the
consumer born at time s: t faces the following problem at tíme t:
Choose cd(s,t), cm(s,t) and m(s,t) for t: s to maximise the
utility function,
m Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5
~(t) - tJ lo9(cd(s,v) cmis,v) m(s,v) Gdlv) Gm(v) )
exP((a}6)lt-v))dv. Yi - ~, YltY2tY3 - 1, (2.1)
subject to the individual consumer's flow budget constraint,
dn(s,t)~dt -(r(t)tB) n(s,t) } w(t) 1(s,t) t ~r(s,t) - z(s,t)
- c(s,t),
and the condition precluding Ponzi games,
b~~ e~~{-~jt(r(u)td)dN} n(s,t) - o,
where total consumption is defined as
(2.2)
(2.3)- 6 -
cls,t) - cd(s,t) t v(t)cm(s,t) t i(t) m(s,t), (2.4)
the nominal interest rate is defined as
i(t) - c(t) t p(t), (2.5)
a denotes the subjective rate of time preference, B denotes the
constant instantaneous probability of death, w(t), r(t), p(t) -
(dP(t)~dt)~P(t), P(t) and v(t) denote the real wage, the real
interest rate, the inflation rate, the price level and the real
exchange rate (the price of foreign goods in terms of home goods) at
time t, respectively, and 1(s,t), n(s,t), n(s,t) and z(s,t)
denote employment, real non-human wealth, profits and lump-sum
taxation at time t of an individual bcrn at time s ~ t,
respectively. The individual consumer receives (pays) for every period
oE his liEe a premium, Bn(s,t), and at the time oE death the
individual's net wealth (debt) goes to (is cancelled by) the life
insurance company. The premium is actuarially fair, so that the liEe
insurance (or annuities) market is efficient. Equation (2.3) ensures
that the individual cannot roll over his debt Eorever. The consumers
maximise expected utility, so that the probability of death is added
to the subjective rate of time preference. Total consumption consists
of consumption oE home and Eoreign goods p13s the interest foregone on
money holdings.
The Eirst-order conditions Eor the individual consumer yield
cd(s,t) - Ylc(s.t), cm(s.t) - Y2c(s,t)~v(t). m(s,t) - Y3c(s,t)~ilt)
and the 'tilt' oE the total consumption Eunction, dc(s,t)~dt -
(r(t)-a) c(s,t). The individual consumer ensures that the marginal
rate oE substitution between home goods and foreign goods equals the
real exchange rate and between home goods and real money balances
equals the opportunity cost oE holding real money balances, i.e., the
nominal interest rate. The assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences
implies that the elasticities of imports with respect to the real
exchange rate and of money demand with respect to the nominal interest
rate equal unity. One can write total consumption as
c(s,t) - ( a}9) (n(s,t) t h(s,t)~ (2.6)- 7 -
where human wealth at time t of an individual born at time s is
given by ~
h(s.t) - tJ~(wlv) lls.v) t rls,v) - z(s.v))
exp{-tJv(r(u)}9)dy}dv. (2.7)
Human wealth is the discounted stream of after-tax income, where the
discount rate is augmented with the probability of death in order to
allow for the fact that individuals only earn income when they are
alive. The consumption function is linear in human plus non-human
wealth, because the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is
assumed to be unity. This assumption facilitates the aggregation
across individuals born at the same instant. ( Hlanchard (1985)
discusses the implications of genezal iso~elastic utility functions
for non-monetary economies.)
2.2. ~gregation across individuals
The aggregation procedure for Eamilies of finitely-lived agents
due to Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) will be applied. At each
instant t a new cohort of size ~ is born. Since S is also the
probability of death, the size at time t of the surviving cohort
born at time s: t equals 8 exp(-g(s-t)) and therefore the total
popuiation at time t equals tJ~s exp(-S(s-t)) ds - 1. The
population aggregate for, say, total consumption is obtained as the
sum of the total consumption of all surviving cohorts at time t
times the size of the surviving cohort, so that it is defined as
C(t) e g -mftc(s,t) exp(S(s-t)) ds. (2.8)
Other population aggregates are obtained in a similar fashion and are
also denoted by a capital letter.
Application of this aggregation procedure yields Cd - y1C, Cm -
Y2C~v. M - Y3C~i,
dC(t)~dt - ( r(t)-a) C(t) - S(at8) N(t) (2.9)- 8 -
and
dN(t)~dt - r(t) N(t) t w(t) L(t) t R(t) - Z(t) - C(t). (2.10)
The derivation of (2.10) made use of the fact that, in the absence of
bequests, the non-human wealth of newly born individuals must be zero,
n(t,t) - 0. Unlike (2.2), (2.10) does not contain a life insurance
premium as this corresponds to a transEer from those who die to those
who survive and therefore this does not affect the return on aggregate
non-human wealth. Aqgregation of human wealth gives dH~dt -(rtg)H -
wL - II t Z. Substitution of this and the aggregate consumption
function, C - (atg)(NtH), into (2.10) yields (2.9).
2.3. Financial assets and the government budget constraint
The asset menu of consumers consists of real home government
bonds, real foreign government bonds and home cash. Non-human wealth
corresponds to N- M t B, where H denotes holdings oE home and
foreign government bonds by home individuals. The government services
its debt, spends on home and foreign goods, levies lump-sum taxes and
finances the resulting deficit by printing money or by borrowing. This
is captured by the government budget constraint:
dD(t)~dt - r(t)D(t) t G(t) - Z(t) - 6M(t), D(0) - D0, (2.11)
where D denotes the government debt issued to home and foreign
individuals, G- Gd f vGm denotes total exhaustive government
spending and 9 denotes the exogenous growth rate of the aggregate
nominal supply of outside money. Integration oE (2.11) and the
solvency (no Ponzi games) condition gives
D(t) - t!~(z(v) t eM(v) - G(~)) eXP(-tl~r(v)av) a~, (2.11~)
so that the current real government debt plus the present discounted
value of future government spending has to be paid off by the present
discounted value of future lump-sum and inflation taxes. Noté that the
assumption of Einite lives drives a wedge between the discount cate
used to calculate human wealth, r t S, and the discount rate used to- 9 -
calculate government debt, r. This wedge is the main reason why the
Ricardian debt neutrality proposition does not hold, so that the
burden of higher taxation can be passed on to future generations.
Equiiibrium in the money market is given by
dM(t)~dt -( B - p(t)) M(t), m(0) - Eree, (2,1Z)
where the initial price level and the initial holdings of real money
balances depend on expected Euture events and are therefore
unconstrained by their past history.
It is assumed that the government has Cobb-Douglas preferences
over home and foreign g~ods, so that Gd -(1-y') G and Gm - y'G~v
where y' is the share of imports in total government spending.
Feedback rules for taxation, government spending or monetary growth
are required, because in the absence of such rules the solvency of the
government's finances is not guaranteed and therefore the government
debt explodes. A sensible tax rule (Huiter, 1987a) is
Z(t) - Zp t E.1DIt) - {Z(dDlt)rdt~. ~1. ~2 ~ D. (2.13)
and a similar rule for government spending is
G(t) - CD - E3DIt) t~4(dDlt)rdt~. E.3. ~4 ~ 0. (2.14)
Upon substitution into the government budget constraint (2.11), one
has
dD(t)~dt -~{(r(t)-~1-~3) D(t) t GO - ZD - BM(t)}, (2.15)
where ~- 1~(1-{Z-~4). To ensure the solvency of the government's
finances, it is assumed either that I;1 t~3 ~ r and {2 - 1;4 - 0
(~-1) or that {1 -{3 - 0 and {Z t{4 i 1({~o). The first
possibility is discussed at length in Section 4. The second
possibility is discussed in Section 3. Under the second possibility a
long-run increase in taxation leads in the short run to government
surplusses and is therefore preceded by short-run cuts in taxation and
increases in government spending . The government has Eour policy- 10 -
instruments, viz., G0, Z0, 9 and D, oE whích the first three can
be chosen independently and the fourth one follows residually from the
government budget constraínt.
2.4. Production, labour demand and wage rigidity
Firms produce at home under perEect competition and maximise
profits subject to a concave and twice-diEferentiable production
function, Y- f(L), f' i 0, f" c 0 where Y denotes aggregate
production and L denotes aggregate employment. Hence, the marginal
product of labour equals the real wage and labour demand and aggreqate
supply are decreasing functions of the real wage, L- L(w), L' -
lIE" c 0 and Y- Y(w), Y' - f'If " c 0. For simplicity, a Cobb-
Douglas production function, say f(L) - pOLp, 0 c p c 1, is
assumed, so that L(w) -(pOplw)lI(1-p). Ylw) - p0(pOplw)pI(1-P) and
wLIY - p.
It is assumed that either real or nominal wages are rigid and are
above the macket-clearing level, so that individuals are rationed in
their supply of labour. This means that their actual supply of labour
is given by the demand for labour and should aEEect their human wealth
and consumption rather than the notional supply oE labour. Obviously,
this spill-ovec of labour market disequilibrium into the goods market
implies that consumption will be less than iE individuals are not
rationed. There is a reasonable amount of empirical evidencE that
Europe and Japan are chacacterised by real wage rigidity whilst the US
and Canada are characterised by nominal wage rigidity le.g., Branson
and Fiotemberg, 1980; Bruno and Sachs, 1985; van der Ploeg, 1987b).
These stylistic facts will be taken account of. Hence, the home
country corresponds to Europe and Japan and has real wage rigidity,
P(t) W(t) I PC(t) - WO L~, W0, W~ U, (2.16)
where Pc denotes the consumecs' ideal price index. Layard and Nickell
(1986) provide some empirical evidence for wage bargaining equations
of this type. If the opportunity coats of holdinq real money balances
are ignored, the ideal cost-of-living index associated with the
utility function (2.1) is an average oE home and foreign prices:- 11 -
Y2 ~3
Pc - P v i '- P vY, Y- YZIIY1tY2)
Upon substitution of (2.16) and (2.17) into Y(w), one obtains
aggregate supply of the home country:
Y - p0((W~rpOP) vY~-PI(1-Ptw) - .f(~).
(2.17)
(2.18)
Hence, an appreciation of the real exchange rate reduces the relative
price oE imports, cuts the wedge between the consumers' and producers'
wage and therefore boosts aggregate supply. The foreign country
corresponds to the US and Canada and has nominal wage rigidity,
P"(tl t w~lt) -~" lo9(u.~"I(1-Lk(t))~ ; 8" (2.19)
ahere foreign variables ere denoted by an as[erisk, u denotes the netural n
. . .
rate of unemployment, and w ( t) ~(dW (t)~dt)~W (t) denotes the growth rate of
the foreign real wage. Core inflation in the foreign country is given by long-
run inflation, that is the exogenous growth in the nominal money supply (cf.,
[iuitcr and Miller, 1982). The difference in Che nature of the labour market
disequilibrium is the main asymmetry in Chis two-country model.
'.5. lnternaticna~ in-erdepen~.ence
The world consists oE two economies with identical preferences,
technologies and demographic structures. The foreign country has
similar relationships to the ones discussed in Sections 2.1-2.4
(except for (2.16) and (2.18)) and its variables are denoted by an
asterisk. There is no labour mobility between the two countries and
there is no currency substitution. There is perEect substitution and
risk-neutral arbitrage between home and foreign government bonds,
which results in uncovered interest parity:
i(t) - ik(t) t C((dE(t)Idt~IE(t)) (2.20)
where E denotes the nominal exchange rate and C{.} denotes the
expectations operator. Alternatively, r(t) - r~(t) t
C{(dv(t)Idt)~v(t)}, where v- P"EIP, must hold. There is imperEect
substitution between home and foreign goods and each country is wholly- 12 -
specialised in the production oE its exportable. The condition Eor
equilibrium in the home goods market is given by
y- Cd t Gd t Cmw t Gm.
and the one for the Eoreign goods market is given by
Y~ - Cd" f Gd~ t Cm t Gm.
(2.21)
(2.22)
Net holdings of foreign assets are the excess oE private sector
agents' holdings of bonds over government debt, that is F- B- D.
Equilibrium in the world bonds market gives B t vB~ - D t vD~, which
implies Fk --F~v. The current account consists of interest payments
on net Eoreign assets plus the balance of trade and equals the
increase in wealth oE the nation:
dF(t)~dt - r(t)F(t) } Cm"(t) t Gm"(t) -
v(t)(Cmlt) t Gm(t)~. (2.23)
An alternative expression for the balance of trade gives it as the
excess of domestic production over domestic absorptions, that is
Y- Cd - vCm - G. Note that (2.23) follows from subtraction of (2.11)
and (2.12) from (2.10). Integration oE (2.23) and application oE the
country's solvency condition gives the country's intertemporal budqet
constraint:
-F(t) - tJm(Y(v) - Cd(v) - v(v)Cm(v) - G(v)~
exp(-tJvr(u)dv) dv (2.23')
which says that the current debt of the nation eventually has to be
paid ofE by future savings' surplusses of the government and private
sector (i.e., by future balance-of-trade surplusses). There wi11 be
jumps in the initial value oE the real exchange rate, v(0), and
therefore in the initial level of foreign assets. The model is not
complete until a rule for where bonds are held initially is speciEied.
For example, if all goods are denominated in the foreign (home)
country's goods then F(F") is predetermined. To simplify matters, it- 13 -
will be assumed that initially neither country holds any foreign
assets anà therefore F(0) - 0.
2.6. The complete model
The complete two-country model can be summarised by ten
equations:
dC~dt -(r-a) C- ti(ntB) (MtDtF), C(0) - free (2.24)
dC"~dt - (r-((dv~dt)~v)-a} C' - S(at(3) (M"tD~-(F~v)),
C'(0) - free (2.25)
dM~dt -( rt9) M - y3C, M(0) - free (2.26)
dM"~dt -(r-((dv~dt)~v)t8"} M" - y3C", M~(0) - free (2.27)
dD~dt -!;((r-~1-(;2) D t GO - ZO - 6M~, D(0) - DO (2.28)
dD"~dt -~{(r-((dv~dt)~v)-i;1-E:2~ D~ t GOk - Zp" - 9"M"},
D"(O) - DO" (2.29)
dF~dt - rF t y2(vC~-C) t y'(vG0"-GO) t y'v{-~3D" t
~4~((r-((dv~dt)~dv)-~1-1:2)D~ t G0~ - Z0~ - 9~M~~} -
Y~{-~3Dt~4~((r-l;1-{2)D t GO - ZO - AM~}, F(0)-0 (2.30)
dX~~dt -~y~ log{un~~(1-L(X~M~))} X~, X"(0) - XO" (2.31)
y(v) - Y1C t(1-y')GO t y2vC' f y'vG" t(1-y')
{-~3D t I;4~((r-~1-{2)D t GO - ZO - 9M~} (2.32)
Y(XkM~) - Y1C~ t(1-y')G0~ t y2(C~v) t y'(G~v) t(1-y')
{-f3D~ t l;r~((r-Ildv~dt)~v)-1:11;2)D' t GO" -
ZO" - 9"M"~} (2.33)
where X" - W~~M" denotes the Eoreign wage normalised by the foreign
money supply. The goods market equilibrium conditions, ( 2.32)-(2.33),
can be solved for v, dv~dt and r in terms oE the state-space- 14 -
variables, viz., C, C`, M, M~, D, D", F and X", and the policy
instruments, viz., GO' GO'' ZO' ZO"' 9 and 9". The s[ate-space
variables can then be solved Erom (2.24)-(2.31) in terms of the policy
instcuments. Note that the distribution of taxes and government
spending across generations does not affect aggregate outcomes.
3. Steady-state properties
In the long run inflation is entirely determined by monetary
growth, so that p-pc-9 and p~-pck-6~. The rate of depreciation of
the home country's nominal exchange rate equals the difference between
home and foreign monetary growth, (dE~dt)~E - 9- A', so that in the
long run relative purchasing power parity holds. In the country with
nominal wage rigidity unemployment and output are in the long run at
their natural rates, 1-Lw - un~ and Y" - f(1-un"). In the country
with real wage rigidity long-run employment and output depend on the
wedge between the real producers' and consumers' wage and thereEore
~
depend on the long-run real exchange rate, i.e., L- f-1(Y (v)) and
Y-~(v), so that aggregate demand can affect long-run activity in
the home country. The long-run real exchange rate follows together
with the long-cun real interest rate Erom the equilibrium conditions
for the home and foreign goods markets. Before this can be discussed,
it is necessary to derive the expressions for the long-run levels of
total consumption. This will be done Eor the case ~1 -~3 - 0, so
that G(m) - GO and Z(m) - Z0.
Long-run non-human wealth follows from (2.10) and (2.13) and is
the annuity value of private dissaving, N--(f(L)-ZO-C)~r, whilst
human wealth is the discounted sum of after-tax income, H-(f(L)-
ZO)~(r}S), so that total consumption is given by
C - (at6) ( NtH) - d(ató) (fIL)-ZO)~((rtB)(a}S-r)). (3.1)
It is assumed that a ~ r(m) ~ at9 holds. Hence, consumption and
total wealth are increasing functions of income and the real interest
rate and decreasing functions of taxes. Taxes aEEect total
consumption, because lives are finite (g~0) and therefore the
Ricardian debt neutrality proposition does not hold. An increase in- 15 -
taxation means that the private sector has less human wealth. Also,
the government can afEord to service a larger government debt and, as
with finite lives government debt is part of private sector non-human
wealth, the private sector has more non-human wealth. However, the
fall in human wealth dominates the inccease in non-human wealth and
therefore on balance consumption falls. An increase in the probability
oE death makes individuals more impatient and increases their
consumption, but it also cuts their human wealth and thereEore
consumption. On balance consumption decreases in the long run (ac~a9
- -r(NtH((r-n)~(r}9))}r(afg-r) ~ 0).
Upon substitution of (3.1) and (2.28) into (2.32), one obtains
the home goods market equilibrium (GME) locus,
(rt8)(at8-r) (Y-(1-Y~)G~ - Y~vG~~`~ - 91at8)(YlY t Y2vY") -
(YlZ~ } Y2vZ~")}, 13.2)
and a symmetric expression for equilibrium in the Eoreign goods market
can be obtained Erom (2.33). Aggregate supply at home is a decreasing
function of the real exchange rate, Y- Y(v), so that the AS
schedule slopes downwards (se Fig. 1). A depreciation of the real
exchange rate boosts foreign demand for home goods and cuts aggregate
supply of home goods; the resulting excess demand for home goods is
choked off by the fall in home and Eoreign demand Eor home goods
induced by the fall in the world real interest rate. Hence, the GME
locus slopes downwards in v-r space (see Fig. 1). The above argument
assumes that the indirect effect of an increase in income on aggregate
demand is less than the direct eEfect on aggregate supply (i.e.,
Y18(at6)~(rt8)(atg-r)). Foreign aggregate supply is Eixed, Y~ -
f(1-un~), so that the upward-sloping GME~ locus is steeper than it
would have been under real wage rigidity. It Eollows Erom Fig. 1 that
the long-run real exchange rate and interest rate can be written as:
v- V(GH. GO~, Z ~. ZQ'. w0, un")
- } f - - t
(3.3)
r- R(GU, GD", Z ~. Z~~, m~, un") (3.4)
- - t t ? ?- 16 -
where the signs of the partial derivatives are given below the
expressions and are evaluated on the assumption that there is a
domestic bias in demand, that is yl ~ y2 and y' ~ 2. An inccease
in foreign government spending (or a decrease in foreign taxation)
shifts out the GMEx locus by more than the GME locus, so that the home
country~s real exchange rate depreciates, the wedge between the home
producers' and consumers' wage increases, and home output falls (see
Fig. 1). The incipient excess demand for home goods, arising from the
boost in the home country's net exports and fall in home supply, is
choked off by a Eall in consumption which is induced by a fall in the
real interest rate and a fall in income. Foreign consumption falls by
a smaller amount. An increase in home government spending (or a
decrease in home taxation) leads to a fall in the real interest rate,
an appreciation of the real exchange rate and a boost of home
aggregate supply. It is clear that an increase in government spending
(or a decrease in taxation) crowds out private consumption, because it
cuts the world real interest rate. For home private consumption there
is an additional effect, because a home (foreign) fiscal expansion
also leads to an appreciation (depreciation) of the real exchange rate
and therefore to an increase (fall) in home output, income and
consumption. Note that a fiscal expansion cuts the real interest rate
in the long run, since here it is assumed to be financed by taxes.
When it is financed by bonds, the real interest rate will rise in the
long run (see Section 4.1).
An increase in the home real consumers' wage, w~, reduces home
output and income, which reduces the demand for home and foreign
goods. Hence, both the GME and the GME" locus shift down. It follows
that the real exchange rate appreciates, which attenuates the fall in
home output, whilst the effect on the real interest rate is ambiguous.
An increase in the foreign country's natural unemployment rate shiEts
up both the GME and the GMEk locus, so that the relative price of
foreign goods increases and the effect on the interest rate is
ambiguous. Clearly, the increase in the home wedge means that home
output also falls. Changes in monetary growth, at home or abroad, have
no long-run effects on the real interest rate, the real exchange rate,
output or employment. However, when allowance is made for capital
accumulation such eEfects will occur (Marini and van der Ploeg, 1987).- 17 -
4. Dynamic policy simulation
Table 1 presents the parameter values, values taken on by the
exogenous variables and initial conditions used in the numerical
simulations. The solution is obtained with the aid of a multiple
shooting algorithm (Lipton, et al., 1982). Table 1 also presents the
eigenvalues evaluated at the steady state. It is clear from these that
the system satisfies the saddlepoint property of perfect-Eoresight
systems, since there are four unstable eigenvalues associated with the
jump variables C, C", M and M" and four stable eigenvalues
associated with the predetermined variables D, D~, F and X". There
is one negative eigenvalue with a very small magnitude, -0.016404,
which corresponds to extremely sluggish adjustment and which is mainly
associated with the dynamics of the current account. This mode takes
about 280 periods to settle down to within 1~ of its equilibrium value
(-ln(0.01)~0.016404) whilst the others take only about 10 periods.
4.1. Tight fiscal policy in Europe and loose fiscal policy in the US
To study the effects of fiscal expansion in the US and fiscal
contraction in Europe at the same time, it helps to first look at the
impact of both policy shocks in isolation. Table 2a presents the
results oE an increase in European government spending from G-0.1 to
G-0.15. Expressed in terms of initial GNP the increase amounts to
5.4~. Table 2b pcesents the results for the same increase in US
government spending, G". The figures correspond to percentage
deviations from the initial steady-state values, except for r, r~
and F which are deviations from the initial steady-state values
times 100. Tax rules have been used to stabilise the government debt
(~1-0.5, ~3-0.0).
An unanticipated, permanent fiscal expansion in Europe induces on
impact an excess demand for home goods, which raises prices and -
depresses real money balances. The real exchange rate appreciates,
boosting imports of foreign goods and depressing exports of home
goods. Private consumption is crowded out, but the increase in
domestic output mitigates this effect. The appreciation of the real
exchange rate drives a wedge between the producers' and consumers'- 18 -
real wage. The real producers' wage (w) falls leading to an increase
in employment and output. The rise in imports Erom the US to Europe
causes a small price increase in the US. This implies a fall in real
producers' wages as nominal wages in the US are rigid in the short
run. Consequently, US employment and output increase showing that
fiscal expansion in Europe has a locomotive effect. The locomotive
efEect in our example is relatively small, but note that the eEfect
depends on the demand elasticities which are fairly low in our
example. Private consumption in the US declines due to a deterioration
of the terms of trade. This is manifested most clearly in the Eall of
imports.
Although on impact the real interest rate falls in both Europe
and the US by 0.0178 and 0.0388, respectively, the hothinal interest
rate rises on impact by 0.026á in Europe and by 0.0038 in the US. The
reason is that inElation rises on impact by 0.043~ in Europe and by
0.041~ in the US. The associated ccowding out of private consumption
on impact occurs through Ealls in holdings oE real money balances,
since holdings of bonds do not change on impact and human wealth
increases on impact.
In the medium run government debt in Europe rises fast and the
balance of payments shows increasing deficits leading to an
accumulation of foreiqn debt. The US benefits from increasing interest
receipts on foreign assets. The long-run solutions reflect these
developments. Private consumption in the US has now increased and the
fall in imports from Europe (Cm") is mitigated. As for Europe,
private consumption falls even further and imports from the US (Cm)
eventually change sign because of the increased burden oE foreign
interest payments. In the lonq run employment in Europe remains above
its initial level as a result of the wedge between the producers' and
consumers' real wage. In the US nominal wage flexibility induces
equilibrium in the labour market over time.
Table 2b presents the results for an unanticipated fiscal
expansion in the US. On impact prices in the US rise and the real
producers' wage falls. Output and employment increase substantially.
There is still some crowding out of private consumption but it is
relatively small. The terms of trade improves for the US. As a result- 19 -
Europe is confronted with a depreciation of its real exchange rate and
an increase in its relative consumers' price index. With real wage
rigidity nominal wages increase and producers' prices fall behind. The
increase in real wages induces unemployment and a fall in output, so
that fiscal expansion in the US is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.
Private consumption in Europe declines too, which accentuates the
decline in imports from the US induced by the increase in the relative
price of US goods.
In the medium run the US runs a deEicit on the current account of
the balance of payments and foreign debt is accumulated. Interest
payments now go from the US to Europe. Meanwhile equilibrium in the US
labour market is restored. Output declines and the excess demand Eor
domestic goods induces Eurther price increases. Crowding out of
private consumption continues over time and is reinforced by the
interest payments on foreign debt. Europe becomes worse oEf as time
passes, because its real exchange rate depreciates furthec. The
unhappy results in the short run are therefore magniEied in the long
run. The stream of interest payments from the US may weaken the
process, but the trend is not fully reversed as can be seen Erom the
last two columns oE Table 2b. In the long run unemployment in Europe
remains at a high level. Hence, when Europe has real wage rigidity, a
Eavourable demand shock in the US leads to an increase in the NAIRU of
Europe, as observed in Section. 3.
Note that the real exchange rate overshoots its long-run value
for a European fiscal expansion whilst it undershoots for a US fiscal
expansion. In the absence of international policy coordination US
fiscal policy may be too loose if the US authorities ignore the
adverse effects of fiscal expansion on the European economy. This
conclusion holds for the short and medium run. In the long run the
adverse effects of US fiscal policy are somewhat mitigated by the
positive influence on the European economy oE foreign interest
receipts. It may be argued that fiscal policy in Europe is in turn too
tight, because the beneEicial effects on the US economy are not taken
into account. However, such a conclusion demands a careful
interpretation. In the short run there is a positive effect or~ output
and employment, but consumption and welfare decline. The negative
terms-of-trade effect dominates the output effect in the short run. In- zo -
the long run equilibrium in the labour market is restored and the
output effect vanishes. But then the positive effect of foreign
interest receipts outweighs the negative terms-of-trade efEect and
consumption increases. The conclusion that European fiscal policy is
in the absence of international policy coordination too tight must
therefore be qualified.
4.2. 'Reaganomics': Tax cuts precede cuts in government spending
Table 3a presents the effects of an autonomous reduction in US
tax receipts (AZ~k --0.4) when the variable component oE the tax
rule (~l - 0.5, ~3 - 0) is used to stabilise the government debt.
The impact effects on the US are plausible. Lowering taxes induces
inflation and crowding in of private consumption. Inflation in the US
implies a decline in the US real producers' wage, because nominal
wages in the US are rigid in the short run. Output and employment
increase as the real wage falls, so that tax cuts in the US have
favourable short-run effects on its economy. The US real exchange rate
appreciates. The associated depreciation oE the real exchange rate in
Europe increases the wedge between the producers' and consumers' real
wage. As a consequence the real producers' wage rises which leads to a
fall in European output and employment. This development is reflected
in the lower level of private consumption in Europe. In this sense the
result resembles the fiscal policy variant presented in Table 2b.
The dynamic eEfects are substantial. Government debt in the US
rises fast. (The high figures foc the percentage deviations ate of
course related to a low level of D" in the initial steady state.)
The increase in government debt calls for a gradual rise in taxes to
stabilise the economy. Table 3a shows that the level of taxes
increases, but that the absolute deviations (AZ") become smaller as
time proceeds. The rise in taxes stabilises the economy but the US
runs a deficit on the current account of the balance of payments,
which leads to an accumulation of foreign debt. The burden of foreign
debt weighs heavily on the US economy, because of the interest
payments flowing from the US to Europe. In the long run this has
dramatic effects. Unlike the case of fiscal policy (Table 2b) Europe
becomes more of a rentier economy in the sense that it benefits from- 21 -
the original tax cut in the US. The signs of the relevant variables,
i.e., terms of trade, consumption in both countries, and production
and employment in Europe, eventually reverse. The real exchange rate
of the US starts depreciating at t-4 and the terms ot trade falls
below the initial steady-state value at t-18. The depreciation of
the US ceal exchange rate reflects the fact that ultimately the
interest payments on foreign debt have to be paid by running a surplus
on the trade balance.
Although the system with a tax rule tends towards a new steady
state and is therefore stable, the political economy of the US under
Mr. Reagan suggests that cuts in US taxation gradually lead to
increases in US government debt and only then to cuts in government
spending (cf., Blanchard, 1987). The political economy of fiscal
deflation in the US is such that a rule for government spending to
ensure the solvency of the government's finances is, perhaps, more
realistic than a tax rule. Hence, Table 3b presents the effects of a
previously unanticipated, permanent cut in US taxes (ez~ - ez0~ -
-0.2 at t-0) when the government spending rule is given by (2.13)
with ~3-0.1 and ~4-0.0. As before, the impact effects on output
and employment are positive for the US and negative for Europe. They
are much larger in magnitude than for the tax cut presented in Table
3a, despite the fact that it corresponds to only half the reduction in
taxes. The reason is that people an[icipate future reductions in
government spending instead of future increases in taxes, so that
human wealth does not fall as much and therefore consumption today
will be higher than in Table 3a. On impact there will be a price
increase in the US leading to a fall in real producers' wages and an
increase in US employment and output. As a result private consumption
of domestic and foreign goods rises. The US real exchange rate
appreciates, which leads to a fall in exports and an increase in the
volume of imports. The depreciation of the European real exchange rate
increases the wedge and induces a fall in employment and output.
Private consumption falls by even more to create room for a rise in
exports from Europe to the US. The price of domestic goods rises in
Europe, which is necessary to crowd out private consumers' spending.
The dynamic efEects show a steady increase in US government debt
and a gradual rise in the deficit on the current account. With a low- 22 -
value for ~3 it takes a long time to stabilise the economy, which is
reflected in the long-run equilibrium values of the model. For
example, if ~3-0.5 instead of 0.1, the steady-state value of the
US foreign debt is 18.89 instead of 204.48 and as a result the
required long-run depreciation oE the US real exchange rate, in order
to generate the long-run trade surplus necessary to finance the
servicing of the foreign debt, is only 12.57 rather than 29.32 (see
Table 3c).
However, the medium-term results merit some closer attention. The
reduction in government spending at t-1 is substantial, because its
deflationary impact leads to a reversal oE signs with respect to
employment and output. Whereas output and employment decrease,
crowding-in allows a rise in consumers' expendituce. This is the
typical pattern Eor the US economy. The government has to cut
expenditure along the adjustment path. This leads to a recession with
output and employment declining for a protracted period of time (the
lowest point is attained at t-9). However, private consumption
flourishes when the government steps back gradually. The US real
exchange rate depreciates as the deflationary efEects of a reduction
in government spending dominate the scene. This has a favourable
impact on the European economy. Unemployment in Europe declines and
from t-3 onwards there is a situation of overemployment. Output and
employment rise along the adjustment path. The depreciation oE the US
zeal exchange rate is reinforced in the course oE time as interest
payments to Europe rise together with the increase in foreign debt.
In the long run there is equilibrium on the US balance oE
payments, but the US emerges as a strong debtor country. The exports
fcom the US to Europe show a dramatic rise, while US imports even
decline. It should be noted that these efEects are mitigated if {3
is higher. For instance, with ~3-0.5 the recession following a cut
in taxes is deeper and shorter. The lowest point in employment is now
attained at t-3. As a result stabilisation of the US economy
requires ultimately a reduction in government expenditure which is
less than half the value of the cut in government expenditure when
~3-0.1. The deeper recession also has a relatively favourable effect
on the balance oE payments. In the new steady state the increase in
the foreign deficit amounts to 18.9 (see Table 3c) which has to be- 23 -
compared with the rise of 204.5 in Table 3b. It follows that
'Reaganomics' should be strong to avoid adverse long-run effects on
the balance of payments. A powerful recession is needed to control the
crowding-in of private consumption.
4.3. Unpleasant monetarist arithmetic
A policy of tight money without a tax rule or an expenditure rule
({1-~3-0.0) to guarantee the solvency of the government's finances
will lead to an excessive growth of government debt. At a certain
point in time agents may refuse to absorb additional government bonds.
To finance the deficit after this ceiling has been attained the
monetary authorities will have to opt for an increase in monetary
growth, that is a policy of 'easy' money. The alternative of
increasing taxes is not considered, because the issue here is to what
extent the monetary authority can fight inflation iE it is not in a
position to make a structural Eiscal adjustment. In other words,
macroeconomic coordination implies that fiscal authorities 'move'
first. Sargent and Wallace ~1981) have shown that such a policy of
tight money now and loose money later may result in a higher rate oE
inflation now, because agents anticipate what is going to happen in
the Euture. In this section the effects of a policy switch Erom tight
money now towards loose money later in the US are discussed. For
convenience, it is assumed that in Europe the government budget is
balanced all the time by adjusting taxes.
To improve our understanding of the policy switch a comparison
will be made with a policy of tight money in the US under a tax rule
(~1-0.5, ~2-0) operating in both countries to stabilise the economy.
In this example macroeconomic policy coordination implies that
monetary authorities 'move' first. The efEects of this benchmark view
are presented in Table 4a. It is assumed that the US monetary growth
rate is reduced by 0.5 percentage points. A monetary disinflation
leads on impact to a fall in the price of domestic goods in the US.
Since there is nominal wage rigidity in the US, the real producers'
wage rises and output and employment decline. Consumption oE domestic
goods and imports fall too, but the balance is shifted towards foreign
goods as the real exchange rate appreciates. The corresponding- 24 -
depreciation of the European real exchange rate increases the wedge
between the producers' and the consumers' wage, which results in
unemployment and a fall in output. As a consequence consumption in
Europe falls as well.
Inflation initially overshoots by 1.318 and subsequently there is
a gradual adaption oE the inElation rate towards the monetary growth
rate in the US. As a result the negative volume eEfects are to a large
extent reversed. The increase in taxes stabilises govecnment debt in
both countries. In the long run there are minor changes in consumption
as a result of opposing chanqes in the components of real wealth. In
the US non-human wealth increases, but human wealth decreases by a
larger amount. In Europe the situation is the other way around,
because foreign assets are accumulated in line with the depreciation
of the real exchange rate.
Note that with a monetary disinflation the real exchange rate
misadjusts rather than overshoots as in the Eamous Dornbusch (1976)
model. The reason is that a monetary disinflation in the US means that
the US becomes a debtor nation and requires a long-run trade surplus
to finance the interest payments to Europe, which in turn zequices a
long-run depreciation of the US real exchange rate. It follows that a
US monetary disinflation is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy in the short
run, but a locomotive policy in the long run.
The effects of tight money now and loose money later in the US
are presented in Table 4b. It is assumed that there is a ceiling on
the amount of government debt, which is attained at t-11. The
maximum increase of debt amounts to about 16i. Before the ceiling is
hit (t-0, 1, ... 10) monetary growth is ceduced by 0.5 percentage
points. At t-11 the ceiling on US government debt is hit, D~ -
16.046, and from then onwards the growth rate oE money is determined
endogenously in such a way that the government budget ís balanced. To
realise a balanced budget the monetary growth rate has to be increased
(see Table 4b). Ultimately A" and p~ rise by more than one
percentage point, so that tight money in the interim period implies a
permanently higher rate of inflation. The reason Eor this is that the
US government now has to service a larger debt (cf., van Wijnbergen,
1985).- 25 -
On impact of the monetary disinflation there is a relatively
small reduction in the price of domestic goods in the US, compared
with the outcome in Table 4a. Real wages rise somewhat and output,
consumption and employment decline. However, the development is
already reversed in period t-1. The reduction in nominal wages
caused by an excess supply of labour exceeds the fall in prices, so
that employment and the other real variables increase. The decline in
the rate of inflation is moderate and stays behind the reduction in
the growth rate of the money stock. Inflation rises in the course of
time and at t-4, long before the ceiling is hit, the rate of
inflation is even higher than in the initial steady state. This result
confirms the finding of Sargent and Wallace that tight money now may
go hand in hand with a higher rate oE inflation now if agents fully
anticipate the corrective measures to be taken later when the private
sector refuses to absorb an increasing amount of government bonds. The
results for Europe as an economy run parallel with those in the US.
The European real exchange rate first depreciates and then
appreciates, which leads to a reversal in the signs of all real
variables.
In the long run there are no effects on real variables. Inflation
increases in the US but does not change in Europe. Non-human wealth in
the US is constant, because the increase in real government debt is
exactly matched by a decline in real cash balances. Money is neutral
in the long run. Long-run changes, as observed in Table 4a, come from
a change in the tax level, which influences human as well as non-human
wealth in a model with Einite lives as shown in Section 3. As
discussed above, taxes are held constant in the Sargent-Wallace
exercise discussed above.
4.4. Supply-side policies
Supply-side policies in Europe can be interpreted as measures to
reduce real wages. Table 5a presents the results of ineasures taken to
reduce the initial steady-state real consumers' wage (w~) by five
percent. A wage reduction leads to an increase in employment and
output. As a result the European tezms of trade declines and part of
the initial fa11 in real wages is reversed as workers have to be- 26 -
compensated for higher import prices. Hence, the real producers' wage
Ealls by only 2.756. The increase in output induces a rise in
consumption of domestic goods, whereas the unfavourable development in
the terms of trade leads to a decline in imports. The impact on the US
economy is small except for US imports from Europe which increase
substantially as European goods become relatively cheaper.
The dynamic effects are moderate and the long-run solution
difEers only slightly from the short-run result. Europe accumulates
Eoreign assets in small amounts. Ultimately, the US has to pay
interest on its foreign debt which is reElected in a somewhat lower
level of imports in the long run. The other side oE the coin is that
consumption in Europe gains from the accruing interest payments. In
the long run imports from the US even increase.
Supply-side policies in the US are directed at reductions in the
natural rate of unemployment. The effects of a reduction in un" by
Eive percentage points are presented in Table Sb. It is assumed that
the reduction is brought about in the initial period, which makes the
interpretation oE the results somewhat easier. A fall in the NAIRU
leads to a decline in nominal wages aEter a lag. On impact of the
supply shock changes are small except for the real rate of interest
which has to increase in both countries to choke oEf consumption in
anticipation of better times. Over the adjustment period nominal and
real wages in the US decline whilst employment and output gradually
increase. Nominal prices decrease to absorb the additional output and
the terms of trade deteriorates. For Europe this means an improvement
in the terms of trade leading to a decrease in the cost of living.
Hence, nominal and real wages decline which results in a rise oE
employment and output.
The situation applies to the medium run, from t-1 to t-10.
Labour market adjustment in the US leads to higher employment and
output which spills over to Europe. Around t-10 the adjustment in
the labour market is nearly completed. Employment increases by S.Sg,
which is consistent with a fall in the natural rate oE unemployment
from 108 to 5~. The long-run results are practically indistinguishable
from the outcomes at t-10. Accumulation of foreign assets by the US- z 7 -
economy occurs at a low rate and the associated interest payments are
therefore negligible.
It follows that supply-side policies in Europe increase welfare
in the US. The U5 terms of trade improves, which raises imports
without affecting the consumption of domestic goods very much. For the
US there are almost no output and employment effects. However, supply-
side policies in the US increase employment and output in both the US
and Europe. The terms of trade moves against the US and the wedge
between the producers' and consumers' real wage in Europe declines.
5. Concluding remarks
A two-country, perfect-foresight model with micro foundations,
finite lives, intertemporal budget constcaints for the two qovernments
and private sector agents, current-account dynamics, uncovered
interest parity, floating exchange rates, imperfect substitution
between home and foreign goods, international labour immobility, real
wage rigidity at home (Europe) and nominal wage rigidity abroad (US)
has been formulated and its steady-state and transient properties have
been analysed. In order to relax the Ricardian debt neutrality
proposition and to give a non-trivial role for fiscal policy, it has
been assumed that there is no intergenerational bequest motive and
lives are finite so that the burden of higher taxation can be passed
on to future generations. This also allows a richer form oE current-
account dynamics. Unemployment has been the main problem oE the OECD
economies in the eighties, so it has been assumed that wages are
inflexible. In view of recent empirical evidence, it has been assumed
that there is nominal wage rigidity in the US and real wage rigidity
in Europe and Japan. This framework allows one to reconsider the
policy conclusions derived from ad-hoc Mundell-Fleming models (Branson
and Rotemberg, 1980; Argy and Salop, 1983; Bruno and Sachs, 1985; van
der Ploeg, 1987b) in an internally consistent fashion. In particular,
it allows one to consider the intertemporal aspects cf the view that a
European fiscal expansion is a locomotive policy whilst a US fiscal
expansion is, typically, a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.- z e -
A European fiscal expansion, when tax rules are used to stabilise
the government debt, leads on impact to a jump apprecation of the real
exchange rate which overshoots its equilibrium value, a Eall in real
interest rates, a fall in European consumption of home goods, an
increase in European impocts, a Eall in European exports, an increase
in European and US output and employment, and a Eall in US
consumption. Hence, as far as output is concerned, a European Eiscal
expansion is a locomotive policy in the short run. Over time the
European government debt builds up and the trade deEicits lead to
Europe becoming a debtor nation. To finance its debt service, Europe
requires a trade surplus in the long run and therefore its real
exchange rate depreciates over time. It Eollows that in the long run
European consumption falls even more whilst US consumption increases.
A US fiscal expansion leads on impact to undershooting oE its real
exchange rate, an increase in US output and employment, a fall in US
consumption, and a Eall in European output, employment and
consumption. Hence, a US fiscal expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour
policy in the short run. Over time the US real exchange rate continues
to appreciate, which further raises the European wedge between the
consumers' and producers' wages and thus further depresses European
output and employment. The US emerges as a debtor nation.
An autonomous reduction in US tax receipts leads to misadjustment
of the terms oE trade, consumption in both countries and European
employment; on impact (in the long run) the US real exchange rate
appreciates (depreciates), European consumption, output and employment
fall (increase), and US consumption increases (falls). Hence, a cut in
US taxes is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy in the short run but a
locomotive policy in the long run. The political economy of the US
under Mc. Reagan suggests that cuts in US taxation gradually lead to
increases in US government debt and only then to cuts in government
spending, hence a rule for government spending to ensure the solvency
oE the government's finances may be more cealistic. Because people
anticipate future cuts in government spending rather than increases in
taxes, human wealth does not fall as much and consequently the impact
eEfects on US output and employment are much larger. As the government
cuts back, private consumption flourishes. When 'Reaganomics' is
strong, that is when government spending reacts strongly tó government
debt, there is a much deeper (temporary) recession and as a zesult the- 29 -
US debt is much less high and the US real exchange rate needs to
depreciate much less.
The Sargent-Wallace (1981) arguments about unpleasant monetarist
arithmetic can also be considered. When there is no tax rule or
government spending rule to stabilise the government debt and when
there is a limit to the amount of government bonds the private sector
is prepared to purchase, an excess of government spending over taxes
plus seignorage revenues must eventually be financed by either an
increase in monetary growth or a structural fiscal adjustment. In the
former case, tight money today implies high inElation tomorrow and,
under perEect foresight, high inflation today. Also, in the process
the government debt has increased and therefore one ends up with a
permanently higher inflatLOn rate in order to generate the seignioraqe
revenues to meet the interest payments on the additional government
debt (van Wijnberqen, 1985). In the latter case, one ends up with
either a pecmanently lower level of government spending or a
permanently higher level of taxation.
A US monetary disinflation leads on impact to an appreciation of
the US real exchange rate, which misadjusts rather than overshoots its
equilibrium value. As far as European consumption, output and
employment is concerned, a US disinElation is a beggar-thy-neighbour
policy in the short run and a locomotive policy in the long run. The
reason is that over time the US becomes a debtor nation and requires a
long-run depreciation of the US real exchange rate, which reduces the
wedge between the European producers' and consumers' wage and
consequently boosts European output and employment in the long run.
There are at least two important directions of future research.
The first is concerned with the effects of capital accumulation in an
interdependent world. The assumption of finite lives drives a wedge
between the discount rate used to calculate government debt and the
one used to calculate human wealth and thereby ensures that an
increase in monetary growth reduces the world intecest rate and
increases both home and foreign capital accumulation (van der Ploeg,
1988). It is interesting to investigate such interdependent Mundell-
Tobin effects in a two-country model with unemployment. The second
direction is concerned with the international coordination of optimal- 30 -
.:scal and monetar, po:icies in a rwo-coun.ry wo:id ~.~ith micrc
`r a:da--or.s ( iCenoe, 198~; van de: ?-oeg, 1987a). The recent wcrk of
Caivo a~d Obs:feld ( 1988) may be usefci in this context.
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